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DEVELOPMENT OF DESCENT IN INDIANA
JOHN S. GRIME-st
A study of the law of descent in Indiana offers as wide a field of
inquiry to the political scientist as to the lawyer. Revisions in the
treatment of the next of kin, spouses, and children other than the issue
of a legal marriage brought about by the Probate Code' can be
attributed to changes in legal thinking wrought principally by a hundred
years of economic development that transformed Indiana from a rural
economy in the 1850's to the industrial state of today.
Two major tenets of public policy may be discerned in the 1953
Probate Code. The first is that the state has progressed conceptualis-
tically to the point where it is now becoming a living idea, the object
of the affections of individual citizens, although not to the full
measure of the role that it plays in the minds of citizens in a totali-
tarian system. Second is the recognition that in a highly developed
economy the fostering of trade is a leading principle of public policy.
This entails the fullest possible protection of credit. It is manifest that
the interests of the individual, as well as of the state, will best be
served by freeing his credit from any shackles that may be imposed
upon it after, as well as before, his death. Thus, creditors must have
the same power to satisfy their claims from the deceased's assets after
his death as exists during his lifetime-even though in isolated cases
hardship might result to those persons who might be considered the
normal objects of his affections. Successors to the deceased's property
should have no greater rights, as against his creditors, than did the
deceased during his lifetime. 2 These twin pillars of policy have sub-
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis Division.
1. Ind. Acts 1953, c. 112. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-101---8-219 (Burns Repl. 1953)-
herein cited: e.g., Probate Code § 6-101.
2. This feature of the Probate Code is no doubt largely a result of the fact that
the Probate Commission was composed principally of lawyers and bankers.
The Statutes of Merchant, Acton-Burnell de Mercationibus, 11 EDw. 1 (1283);
13 EDw. 1, Stat. 3 (1285), and the Statute of Staples, 27 EDw. 3, Stat. 2 (1353), to-
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stantially changed the law of descent in Indiana under the Probate
Code.
In terms of realty, at least three basic theories of ownership of
property have developed among the peoples of the globe: (1) central-
ization of the incidence of ownership (at least to the extent it had been
recognized) in the clan or in the old man of the clan, particularly promi-
nent among pastoral and other nomadic peoples;3 (2) of very early,
and also quite recent, development is the thought that ownership of
all realty is by the state ;4 and (3) concentration of most property rights in
the hands of individuals, the extent of the concentration depending
upon the political philosophy of the times.5
It is maintained by Pollock and Maitland that in coming to England
the Germans did not bring with them the clan theory of ownership.,
gether with the writ of elegit, Statute of Westminster II, 13 EDw. 1, c. 18 (1285),
seem to be the first recorded stirrings of the great driving force in favor of protecting
credit. These acts enabled the creditor to seize lands of the debtor and hold as a
tenant by statute Merchant, Staple, and elegit, which was an estate of freehold
capable of descent but defeasible upon payment of the debt. Co. LITr. 289b. It has
had a curious survival in the Indiana practice of first offering at execution sales the
rents, issues, and profits for seven years. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3906 (Burns 1933).
3. Thus, the reference to the flocks of Abraham in Genesis 26:35. See BAIKIE,
THE LIFE OF THE ANCIENT EAST 197 (1923); JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN
LAWS, CONTRACTS AND LETTERS (1904).
Ceasar and Tacitus (6 DEBELLO GALLIco 22) would lead one to the belief that the
tribes residing east of the Rhine were of seminomadic habits, with quasi-communal
concepts of ownership. This conclusion has been questioned, however, by DECAULONGES,
ORIGINS OF PROPERTY IN LAND 4-11 (1899).
On this continent, Indians in the Midwest seem to have had the tribal concept.
Treaties were made with the "chiefs and head warriers" rather than each individual.
For example, see the Fort Wayne Treaty of 1803 in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND
TREATIES 64 (1904).
4. See BREASTED, HISTORY OF EGYPT C. V (1909) ; MASPENO, DAWN OF CIVILIZATION
299 (1922). The authorities are agreed that following the battle of Hastings in 1066,
the Northumbrian Rebellion in 1072, and finally the convocation on Salisbury plain in
1085 after the abortive Danish invasion, title to all land in Engand except allodial
holdings in certain channel isles was vested in the King. "Z tenet terrain illam de ...
doininigo Rege." 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 232. See BL. COMMt.
*49, *105; DIGRY, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, C. I, § 2 (1897).
The most obvious modern example is the communistic system with the "collective
farm." But see also the English Agricultural Act of -1947, 10 & 11 GEo. 6, c. 48, § 16,
and the development of the "production for use" idea, which permits legal divestment
of an owner's title for failure to put land to such proper use as the state may prescribe.
See also IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 15-1801-1807 (Burns Repl. 1950), permitting the control
of land use for conservation purposes; and from the same trunk stems municipal, id.
§ 53-703 et seq., and county, id. § 53-711 et seq., land planning and zoning authority. Bd.
of Zoning Appeals v. Wheaton, 118 Ind. App. 38, 76 N.E.2d 597 (1947).
5. Ownership concepts seem to have been shaped more by economic and political
factors than by the degree of civilization. SEEBOHm, THE ENGLISH VILLAGE COMt-
MUNITY C. VI (1915). Even extremely primitive peoples have developed extensive ideas
of individual ownership. See MOCHTON, TAMING NEW GUINEA (1921).
6. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW c. VI, § 1, contending that
spindlesibship was at least as strong as spearsibship and that, therefore, the presence of
descent to cognates prevented the existence of a clan concept.
DEVELOPMENT OF DESCENT IN INDIANA
Yet there is strong reason to believe that much of the Anglo-Saxon
holdings were "folkland," i.e., owned by the family, in contrast with
"bookIand" which was probably the subject of individual ownership.7
But whether the doctrine of family ownership was of Anglo-Saxon
origin or of later development, it is clear that many of the English laws
of descent were shaped by a struggle for mastery between the concepts
of individual and clan ownership that developed after the Norman
conquest.
Nor is this struggle only of historical significance. The theories
of ownership in the state, individual, or family continue to shape
probate law. Creating indefeasible rights in the members of one's family
constitute limitations on individual ownership; granting protection to
creditors after the debtor has died represents an extension of the in-
dividual, and a limitation on the family, ownership concepts; early escheat
to the state is a further limitation on the theory of family ownership.
To a great extent, therefore, modern probate law represents a com-
promise between these concepts of title.
I
Presumably, the earliest feuds, being granted by the crown pri-
marily for military services, were personal to the feoffee and terminated
with his death.8 Early there appeared, however, a forma doni, which
by addition of the words et haeres indicated the feoffor's consent that
the right of possession and use of the fief could be enjoyed by the
feoffee's legal heirs.9 Initially, et haeres seems to have had three legal
effects: (a) it created an estate that passed to the feoffee's heirs on
his death rather than reverted to the feoffor; (b) it gave an interest
of some sort immediately to the body of the feoffee's heirs so that the
feoffee could not subinfeudate or transfer the fief without consent of
the heirs;1O and (c) it created a type of determinable fee with a
possibility of reverter to the feoffor when the blood line of the feoffee
ran out. 1 The latter was corrected by the addition of the words
7. 2 HOLDSWORTH, HIsToRY OF THB CommON LAW 67-68.
8. 2 BL. COMm. *108; LITrLEro, TENURES, Book I, c. 1, § 1. But the Anglo-Saxon
concept permitted property to descend to successors ad infinitum. DIGBY, op. cit. supra
note 4, at c. I, § 1. The descent of lands was firmly established in 1267 when the
Statute of Mort d'Ancestor, 52 HEN. 3, c. 16, permitted a deceased's heirs to avail
themselves of writs of novel disseisin against third party intruders and thus recapture
the estate of which their ancestor was in possession.
9. Until Quia Emptores, at least, all feuds were gifts by way of subinfeudation
with the donor retaining a reversionary right.
10. GLANviLLF, Book VIII, c. 1.
11. BRAcro, NOTE BooK 17; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE CoOMON LAW 116;
2 POLuOCx & MAITLAND, HIsw oy oF ENGLISH LAW 14.
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et assignees, which permitted the donee by transfer to avoid the
possibility of reverter to the feoffor. And the Statute of Quia Emptores
Terrarum,'2 in 1278, by succeeding subinfeudation with substitution,
seems to have had the same effect of terminating the possibility of
reverter although the words et assignees were not used. Relics of the
feudal concept remained, however, or perhaps were revived by the doctrine
that an enfeoffment without consideration created a resulting use in the
feoffor-for the common law had developed the doctrine that if one
enfeoffed another without consideration, on the death of the feoffee
leaving no lineal descendants, the property reverted to the feoffor.13
This antique, which presumably remained the common law in Indiana,
was confirmed by Statute in 185214 and continued as Indiana law until
its repeal by the Probate Code.15
The clan concept of an immediate interest of the prospective
heirs in the estate of their living ancestor gradually died out although
sufficient residue persisted until thd fourteenth century to give trouble
to Bracton. 1 6  This concept was superseded by the juristic approach
that the words et haeres merely designated the type of estate which was
given, i.e., a fee capable of descending to the owner's heirs, instead of a
life estate. The words et haeres were construed to limit the type of
estate given-a fee-and hence were "words of limitation" rather than
"words of purchase" denoting persons to whom something was given;
for nemo est haeres viventis.17 From this it followed by the logical
12. 18 EDW. 1. (1290).
13. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COmmON LAW 229 (1713). Glanville felt differently
if the donor was the father and the donee had remote heirs since the property could
not ascend. GLANViLLE, Book VII, c. 1.
14. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, § 7.
15. Probate Code § 6-201 and Commission Comments thereto.
16. BRACrON, NOTE BOOK 224, 1685. Blackstone believed that this dying out was
accomplished by the grantor warranting himself and his heirs to defend the title. 2 BL.
Comm. *301. "Ego et haeredes nzei warranthiabimus et imperpetnum defendemus." LITrL-
TON, TENURES § 733. Before Quia Emptores, a warranty bound only the grantor for his
lifetime. Co. LITT. 348a. Unless the grantee was to hold of the grantor, in which case
the warranty was presumed upon homage so as to bind the grantor's heirs, after Quia
Emptores special covenants of warranty were necessary.
17. The temporary setback of the family interests resulting from construction of
the words et haeres as words of limitation was avoided by restricting the class of heirs
through use of the words et haeres corporeum. Temporarily, this created a fee in which
the family was the unit of ownership. However, ingenious property lawyers soon deter-
mined that this effected a fee conditional until heirs of the body were born, at which
time it became a fee simple absolute. LITTLtTON, TENURES, Book I, c. 2. This time the
landed gentry had resort to Parliamentary relief. In 1285, as a part of the great Parlia-
ment of II Westminster, the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 EDw. 1, was enacted.
This reinstated the clan ownership concept by converting the conditional fee, created
by an enfeofment to X and the heirs of his body, into a fee tail, an estate that con-
tinued in the family line as long as there were lineal descendants of the feoffee with a
reversion to the feoffor and his heir when the feoffee's family line was extinguished.
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processes of judicial reasoning that unless such words of limitation
were used the feoffee took only a life estate."' This continued as a part
of the common law in Indiana until 1852, when the Legislature
abolished the necessity for words of limitation in creating a fee in a
conveyance.19 This statute did not, however, affect wills, and the
rule of the necessity of using words of limitation to create a fee con-
tinued in the law of wills. 20  A Statute of 1852, however, contained
a section to the effect that a provision in a will denoting the testator's
intent to devise his entire interest in realty or personalty should pass
all of his estate.21- This was supplemented by an Act of 1929, provid-
ing that unless the testator was shown to have a different intent, a
The fee tail remained intact for approximately 375 years. However, its real effec-
tiveness was destroyed by Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 EDw. 4, 19 (1465), which by legal
chicanery permitted a barring of the entail as against both the heirs and reversioner.
2 BL. Comm. *117. The Statute of Fines, 1540, 32 HEN. 8, c. 36, barred the entail but
not the reversion.
Indiana, in 1831, took the course now followed in all states except Maryland of
abolishing the fee tail by converting the estate into a fee simple. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1831,
c. 29, § 11. However, Ind. Rev. Stat. 1838, c. 29, § 11, preserved the estate for the
first generation. The language of the present Indiana Statute is somewhat ambiguous:
"Estates tail are abolished; and any estate which, according to common law, would be
adjudged a fee tail, shall hereafter, be adjudged a fee simple; and if no valid remainder
shall be limited thereon, shall be a fee simple absolute." IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-138
(Burns Repl. 1951).
The preservation of the remainder after the estate tail was permitted by Ind. Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 28, §§ 56, 57. The remainder was valid as a contingent limitation on a
fee, which would vest in possession at the death of the first taker without leaving
issue. Remainders over after fee tails, however, operated by way of purchase from the
grantor and not by descent from the tenant. Thus, the remainderman takes free of the
debts of the tenant and free from dower. Since the remainder is taken by way of
purchase, it should be subject to the rule against remoteness of vesting. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 51-105 (Bums 1933).
18. For these words made the estate of inheritance, LIrrLEToN, TsNuREs § 1.
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-105 (Burns Repl. 1951).
20. 2 BL. Commnt. *108. The severity of the common law did not apply to wills,
however, and words of limitation seem to have been used as a guide to intent, a life
estate being implied unless words of perpetuity were used.
21. Ind. Acts 1852, c. 11, § 2. The problem of determining whether language
that once constituted "words of purchase" is now mere surplusage or is to be treated
as words of purchase is complicated by § 6-601(c) of the Probate Code: "A devise
of real or personal estate, whether directly or in trust, to the testator's or another
designated person's 'heirs' or 'next of kin' or 'relatives,' or 'family,' or to 'the persons
thereunto entitled under the intestate laws' or to persons described by words of similar
import, shall mean those persons, including the spouse, who would take under the intestate
laws if the testator or other designated person were to die intestate at the time when
such class is to be ascertained, domiciled in this state, and owning the estate so devised.
With respect to a device which does not take effect at the testator's death, the time when
such class is to be ascertained shall be the time when the devise is to take effect in
enjoyment."
While this Subsection, which was taken from the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14 (4) (1950), where it was designed to fill the gap
created by the abolition of the rule in Shelley's Case, was not originally designed to
cover the "words of limitation" problem, it may have that effect.
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devisee should take an interest in fee simple.22 But, except as rules of
intent governed the situation, the common law requirement of the
necessity of using words of limitation in wills to create a fee interest
remained until abolished by the Probate Code. 23 Since it is the Indiana
rule that wills must be construed as of the date of the testator's death,24
another ancient doctrine has fallen. However, where language that
would have been necessary to create a fee at common law is used in
an instrument (and such language will probably continue to be used
for years to come), it must be determined whether such phraseology
is now to be construed as words of purchase, so as to create a present
interest in the beneficiary's heirs, or to be disregarded as surplusage. 25
While Quia Emptores unfolded the concept of alienability inter
vivos, leaving only its method of execution to be perfected by develop-
ment of the "use," the requirements of livery of seisen prevented post-
mortem alienations of land.26  Consequently, real estate owned at the
decedent's death still passed to his heirs subject to dower and curtesy.
The heir took by descent, however, and not by way of purchase; his
enforced taking was due simply to lack of legal means to accomplish a
post-mortem transfer by the ancestors rather than to any interest the
heir had in the realty during the ancestor's lifetime. Nor did the
ancestor's creditors have any remedy of recovery against the realty
after the ancestor's death, although again the difficulty was procedural
and not substantive.
The growth of the use, by dispensing with the necessity of livery
of seisen, or perhaps concepts of policy tending towards broadening
alienation powers permitted a disposition of the equitable interests by
way of an appointment to use. The practice had become so established
in the law of uses that when the Statutes of Uses, 2 7 perhaps inadver-
tently, destroyed the equitable will, the scheme of post-mortem transfers
22. Ind. Acts 1929, c. 175, § 1.
23. Probate Code, § 6-601.
24. Hayes v. Martz, 173 Ind. 279, 89 N.E. 303, 90 N.E. 309 (1909) ; Doe ex rcl.
Lafountaine v. Avaline, 8 Ind. 6 (1856).
25. The ancient doctrine, itemo est haeres viventis, that a limitation to the general
heirs of a living person was void, is no longer the law in Indiana. Probate Code
§ 6-601 (c). Hence, a limitation to A and his heirs could, under the rule of Ridgeway
v. Lanphear, 99 Ind. 251 (1884), be construed to create a devise to A and his
children. See also Haddock v. Gray, 104 Ind. 251 (1885). This in turn could give
rise to application of the rule in Wild's Case, which has been the law in Indiana, King
v. Rea, 56 Ind. 1 (1877), unless Section 6-601 (c) of the Probate Code has the effect
of abrogating this rule.
26. "Only God, not man, can make an heir," said GLANViLLE, Book VII, c. 1.
Maitland felt that the public policy against Mortmain, rather than feudal doctrines,
prevented post obit gifts of land. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, IoI0RvY OF ENGLISH LA&V
§3.
27. 27 HEN. 8, c. 10. (1535).
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was legitimized five years later by the Statute of Wills.2 8  The force
of the common law doctrine of guided descent to the heirs survived
the Statute of Wills, however, and has continued to play a role in
shaping Indiana probate law. This survival is important in several
respects. First, it has led to a doctrine of strict construction of the
execution of wills. Under the theory of prevention of fraud, the
antique safeguards with which a reluctant Parliament circumscribed
the execution of a will have been preserved in all their ancient majesty
although under modern rules of evidence they are more likely to
lead to the perpetration rather than prevention of fraud. Actually,
the rules surrounding the execution of a will are as much designed to
defeat the testator's intention as the rules governing construction are
calculated to preserve it. Their real purpose is to help preserve the
solidarity of the family unit by limiting the power of the ancestor to
disinherit the natural objects of his affections. Indiana has always
been among the more conservative states in requiring close attention
to the statutory requirements of execution of wills, and the Probate
Code, although designed to simplify administration of estates, actually
intensifies the legal prejudice in favor of the heir by adding to the
formal requirements of a will the necessity of publication and of
witnesses signing in the presence of each other .2  In addition, whil6
Indiana has never followed the natural right of inheritance theory
of Wisconsin,80 there is a presumption against a testator's intent to
disinherit; 31 and a disposition of property which disregards the natural
objects of the testator's bounty is a material element in determining
testamentary capacity.32
II
In a like vein, the family unit has been protected in Indiana by
limitations on testamentary power through establishment of the con-
cepts of the pretermitted heir, the forced heir, and the designated heir
and marital interests taken by way of purchase.3 3 All of these, to-
28. 32 HEN. 8, c. 1 (1540).
29. Probate Code § 6-501.
30. Parents have no obligation to leave property to their children in Indiana.
Nesbitt v. Trindle, 64 Ind. 183 (1878).
31. This is somewhat counterbalanced, however, by a presumption that a testator
does not desire to die intestate; it is also offset by an Indiana rule, Garrison v. Day,
36 Ind. App. 543, 76 N. E. 188 (1905), now confirmed by statute, Probate Code § 6-601,
that lapsed, void, or revoked gifts pass through the residuary clause and not by intestacy.
Quaere: Are renounced gifts to be included in this category?
32. Jarret v. Ellis, 193 Ind. 687, 141 N.E. 627 (1923).
33. As used in this article, a "forced heir" is one who has merely an expectancy in
his ancestor's estate. The ancestor can destroy the expectancy by voluntary or involun-
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gether with certain statutory future interests unknown because un-
necessary to the common law, have developed since the Statute of
Wills and are designed to correct situations where public policy has
determined that the line of descent to the heir should not in peculiar
circumstances be interrupted by an ancestor's post-mortem transfer.
Only in the case of the statutory future interest, however, is there
interference with the power of inter vivos alienation by the holder of
the immediate estate or with rights of his creditors after his death.34
The English law built up the doctrine that marriage of the testator
and birth of issue after execution of the will brought about a revoca-
tion. The judges were not agreed, however, as to whether this was
based on the presumed intent of the testator and therefore subject
to refutation by parol evidence or whether its reason was that of
public policy in favor of protection of the children so as to reject
collateral evidences of intent not to revoke. 35 But Indiana, from the
Northwest Territory.Ordinance until 1831,36 laid no statutory restrictions
upon the power of a testator to designate his beneficiaries provided his
will was validly executed.
In 1843, following the English trend, the Indiana legislature
provided that birth of a child after the making of a will revoked it
in toto unless provision for the issue had been made in that instru-
ment.37 The 1852 Code also caused the birth of the child to revoke
tary conveyance inter vivos, and on the ancestor's death the interest can be subjected to
payment of the ancestor's debts. If, however, the ancestor dies owning the particular
property which is subject to the forced heir concept, then such heir takes the property
by descent notwithstanding contrary terms in the testator's will.
The "designated heir" also has a mere expectancy defeasible by inter vivos aliena-
tion by the testator and subject to payment of the testator's debts. The designated heir
is not entitled to inherit any specific property despite the will, but he cannot be deprived
of a designated share of the ancestor's net estate by the will.
The "pretermitted heir" is one who would be entitled to take by descent if the
testator died testate, but who is born after the ancestor executes his will.
34. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, § 27, prevented the husband from destroying
the wife's statutory interest in realty by an inter vivos transfer. Similar protection
was later given against involuntary conversions of realty at judicial sales. Ind. Acts
1875, c. 123, § 1. By a judicial interpretation of the Act of 1891, c. 185, § 1, this protec-
tion was extended to inter vivos dispositions of personalty. Crawfordsville Trust Co.
v. Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N.E. 1049, 102 N.E. 282 (1913).
The realty restriction is preserved in the Probate Code § 6-203, but the restriction
on the sale of personalty has been abandoned. Also omitted from the Probate Code
is the phase of the 1852 Code (1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, § 22) which permitted the
husband to take his statutory share in his wife's estate free of her debts contracted
after marriage.
35. Intent of the testator is the basis for the revocation, Lugg v. Lugg, 2 Salk.
593, 91 Eng. Rep. 497 (1793). Intent is unimportant, Marston v. Fox, 8 Ad. & E. 14,
112 Eng. Rep. 742 (1838).
36. The pretermitted heir provision first appeared in Ind. Rev. Stat. 1831, c. 41,
§ 20.
37. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1843, c. 30, §§ 10-14. Curiously, this statute anticipated the
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the will but somewhat inconsistently retained the 1843 provisions as
to death of the afterborn child before the testator. In this statute,
there was a severe and, at the same time, mild restraint on the testator.
It was severe in that it did not (as do most similar statutes38 ) make
the statutory protection for the pretermitted heir dependent upon the
testator's intention. Most statutes of this sort are designed merely to
correct oversights on the part of the testator, thus permitting the
testator in his will to indicate his desire not to make the afterbbrn
child a beneficiary or make other provision for him by way of insur-
ance or otherwise. 39 The Indiana Statute, however, required that to
avoid revocation the testator must make a specific bequest in the will
providing for the afterborn child. 40 On the other hand, the 1852
Code did not protect children adopted after the will was made,4'
illegitimate children born and acknowledged after execution of the
will, 42 or, apparently, children legitimated after the will.
The Probate Code returns Indiana to what seems the better
doctrine43 that the will should not be regarded as revoked by an after-
born child; such child should take by inheritance regardless of the
will unless the testator has made some provision therein for afterborn
children, the omission appears to have been intentional, or the will
was executed when the testator had children alive and his estate was
left to the surviving spouse. 44  Children adopted after execution of
the will are classed with those born afterwards, but the status of illegi-
timate children born and acknowledged afterwards or born before
and acknowledged afterwards is not clear.45 Since the Probate Code
Probate Code by providing that if no provision was made by devise or settlement for
such afterborn child and he survived the testator or died leaving issue, then his share
was received by way of intestacy. Subsequently, in 1852, the rule was changed, and
birth of a pretermitted heir caused the will to be revoked. 2 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 11,
§§ 3-4. The Probate Code § 6-308 returns to the 1843 procedure.
38. See Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. Rlv. 283 (1928).
39. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws c. 191, § 20 (1933) ; Petition of Minot, 164 Mass. 38,
41 N.E. 63 (1895).
40. See Morse v. Morse, 42 Ind. 365 (1873); Hughes v. Hughes, 37 Ind. 183
(1871).
41. Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 433, 54 N.E. 446 (1899); Markover v. Krauss,
132 Ind. 294, 31 N.E. 1047 (1892) ; Daves v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N.E. 860 (1889).
42. Eckart v. Eckart, 95 Ind. App. 148, 163 N.E. 288 (1932).
43. See Bordwell, supra note 38; Matthews, Pretermitted Heirs, An Analysis of
Statutes, 29 CoL L. Ruv. 748 (1929).
44. Probate Code § 6-308.
45. Acknowledged illegitimate children are, under the Probate Code § 6-103,
considered as "children" only for purposes of descent under § 6-205. This would seem
to literally exclude them from consideration under § 6-308. But a liberally minded
court could construe § 6-308 to indicate that the acknowledged illegitimate child would
have inherited had the testator died intestate and should, therefore, deserve considera-
tion under § 6-308.
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limits revocation of wills by operation of law to those cases specified
in the statute,46 it would seem that Indiana has abrogated the common
law rule that marriage plus birth of a child revoked the will.
47
Adoption of the Probate Code, however, leaves two more snags in
its wake in the case of afterborn children. First: Did the Acts of
1852 have the effect of revoking the will instanter the unprovided for
child was born, or did the revocation operate only if the afterborn
child survived the testator? The use of the words "who shall survive
him" in Section 3 of the Act of 1852 would indicate the latter view-
point is correct. However, Section 4 of the same Act provided: "But
in case such child dies without issue, and the wife of such testator
be living, the estate of the testator, except the wife's interest therein,
shall descend according to the terms of the will; and in case of the
death of the wife, and also of the child, without issue, the whole of
such estate shall descend as directed in the will, unless such child
have a wife living at his death, in which case, such wife shall hold such
estate to her use so long as she remains unmarried." Read literally,
this meant that the will of the testator was immediately revoked upon
birth of a child. If the child survived or died leaving issue who sur-
vived the testator, the will remained revoked. But if the child died
before and the widow of the testator survived the testator, then the
will was revived. If the wife of the testator and the child both pre-
deceased the testator and the child left only a widow, then the widow
took a life interest in the estate which the child would have taken by
inheritance had the testator died intestate, and the will was revived
as to the remainder. "Such estate" is presumed under this Section to
refer to the child's share rather than to the entire estate of the testator.4 s
There still remains the second problem of wills that were revoked
by the birth of a child before January 1, 1954. It would appear that
46. Probate Code § 6-508.
47. Under a similar statute it was so held in Appeal of Mendoza, 141 Me. 299,
43 A.2d 816 (1945).
The New York Code permits the testator to make a "settlement" for a child born
after execution of the will. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 26. Under this act it is
sufficient if the afterborn child is made a beneficiary in a life insurance policy in
substantially the amount that would have been received had the testator died intestate.
However, the court deciding In re Faber's Estate, 305 N.Y. 200, 111 N.E.2d 883
(1953), in construing a statute similar to the Indiana law, determined that the pro-
vision for the afterborn child must appear in the will and. that a collateral settlement
would not suffice. This is unfortunate since it requires the will to be changed each
time a child is born. It should be noted, however, that the testator can provide for
the afterborn or adopted child by codicil, which is a will under the act.
Indiana has never extended the pretermitted heir rule to others than children of
the testator. See 2 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 11, § 1. See also Matthews, supra note 43.
48. Morse v. Morse, 42 Ind. 365 (1873), lends strength to this theory.
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an afterborn child did not take, under Section 4, an absolute fee in-
terest, which was defeasible on his death without issue. If this is
true, then as to testators who had executed a will before January 1,
1954, and had a child born after the will who was not provided for
therein, such child's determinable interest was not increased by the Pro-
bate Code but shall still determine on his death without issue after
January 1, 1954.
In 1881 the forced heir concept was clearly established in Indiana
by the case of Utterbach v. Terhume.49 Until this case was decided,
the courts had construed the childless second wife statute50 as creat-
ing a life estate in the widow with remainder to the children by the
first marriage. 1  Utterbach v. Terhume determined that the wife took
a fee but with a restraint on alienation so long as the children by the
first marriage remained alive.52 The children by the first marriage
became forced heirs of the widow, having a bare expectancy that could
not be conveyed.5 3 However, the original life estate-remainder con-
cept was restored in 1899.54 Since 1947, children by a first husband
have also taken a remainder, and the childless second husband received
a life estate as he does today. 55 Before that time, a childless second
husband took an unrestrained fee.
Another forced heir situation arose.when, under the Act of 1875,
a husband's real estate was sold to pay his debts. After the sale was
consummated, the wife's one-third, one-fourth, or one-fifth statutory
interest was a maximum value of $20,000 became absolute.5 In such
event the husband became her forced heir 57 and took the interest she
had acquired if he survived her,"8 provided she then owned the prop-
erty50 and he had not been guilty of such misconduct as barred his
49. 75 Ind. 363 (1881).
50. 2 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, § 24. The change in 1852 from a life estate by
way of dower to a fee in the widow was actually intended to benefit the children as
well as the widow. So the children by the first marriage took their remainder after the
second childless widow's life estate free of creditors of the deceased father-husband.
51. Martindale v. Martindale, 10 Ind. 566 (1858).
52. See Byrum v. Henderson, 151 Ind. 102, 51 N.E. 94 (1898); Gwaltney v.
Gwaltney, 119 Ind. 144, 21 N.E. 552 (1889); Bryan v. Uland, 101 Ind. 477 (1884);
Flenner v. Benson, 89 Ind. 108 (1883).
53. Johnson v. Johnson, 153 Ind. 60, 54 N.E. 124 (1899).
54. Ind. Acts 1899, c. 99, § 2; see also Ind. Acts 1901, c. 240, § 2; Ind. Acts 1947,
c. 256, § 1.
55. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 256, § 1.
56. Ind. Acts 1875, c. 123, § 1.
57. Elliott v. Cale, 113 Ind. 383, 14 N.E. 708, 16 N.E. 309 (1887) ; Currier v. Elliott,
141 Ind. 394, 39 N.E. 554 (1895).
58. Ind. Acts 1875, c. 128, § 3.
59. Hurst v. Mann, 51 Ind. App. 466, 99 N.E. 828 (1912); Herrick v. Flinn, 146
Ind. 258, 45 N.E. 187 (1896); Summit v. Ellett, 88 Ind. 227 (1882); Haggerty v.
Byrne, 75 Ind. 499 (1881).
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marital rights. 0 The statute treated the widow's interest as though
she had inherited it from her husband to the extent that if she re-
married and died during the second coverture, it passed to the children
by the first marriage, she being barred from alienating it during such
second coverture. The children were also substituted for the first
husband as the wife's forced heirs if the first marriage had terminated
by divorce and not death of the husband.
The wife also took under the 1852 Statute a one-twelfth or one-
fifteenth interest in her husband's realty61 of a nature that was partly
by way of purchase and partly as a forced heir, in that the husband
could not dispose of this share during his lifetime without her consent,
but it was subject to claims of creditors during the husband's life-
time or after his death.62 The husband also held an interest in his
wife's realty that was partly by purchase and partly resembled a taking
by descent as a forced heir. This interest was free of his wife's debts
incurred after marriage if she owned it when she died but was subject
to sale during her lifetime to pay her debts even though incurred after
marriage. 68  Furthermore, she could not defeat this interest by will.64
These forced heir concepts have all been swept away by the Pro-
bate Code although to a certain extent the marital rights have been
retained. Since they were mere expectancies or, in the case of the
marital rights, merely inchoate interests, the Code operated to cut
them off on January 1, 1954, unless they had vested before that time.
Husbands and wives also took as designated heirs in their deceased
spouse's personalty. That is, a deceased spouse could not divest his
mate of the designated interest by will,65 but it was subject to claims
of the deceased spouse's creditors both before and after his death 66-
although an element of the purchase concept has been injected by the
courts.67 With the exception of these marital relationships, Indiana
has never developed the designated heir concept as some other juris-
dictions have done.66  And even these designated marital rights have
60. Bradley v. Thixton, 117 Ind. 255, 19 N.E. 335 (1888).
61. Ind. Acts 1875, c. 123, § 2. That is the difference between the one-third which
the wife could take despite the will and the one-fourth or one-fifth to which she was
limited as against cr.editors.
62. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, §§ 17, 22; Ind. Acts 1891, c. 58, § 1.
63. Noble v. Noble, 19 Ind. 431 (1862).
64. Turner v. Heinberg, 30 Ind. App. 615, 65 N.E. 294 (1902).
65. Ind. Acts 1853, c. 38, § 1; Ind. Acts 1891, c. 185, § 1; c. 58, § 2; Ind. Acts
1901, c. 78, § 1.
66. Ind. Acts 1891, c. 185, § 1.
67. Crawfordsville Trust Company v. Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N.E. 1049,
102 N.E. 282 (1913).
68. New York, for example, limits the amount a testator can give to charity if he
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been greatly changed by the Probate Code.69 Since they were mere
expectancies, such change affected all such rights except where the
spouse had died before January 1, 1954.
The doctrine of legitime never crept into Indiana law.70 Some
jurisdictions have preserved this principle by preventing the ancestor
from disinheriting his child by will although in no state is he prevented
from disposing of his property to other than his children by inter
vivos gifts. There are also jurisdictions which prevent more than a
certain percentage of the estate fro m, tbeing devised to charity or wvhich
void gifts to charity if the testator dies soon after making the will.71
Indiana, however, finds no objection to an unnatural disposition of
the testator's property, and the owner can give all his property away
during his lifetime or devise it by will with the effect of pauperizing
his descendants. 72 No public policy has ever been developed in Indiana
which requires that one support his children after his death. The
problem of the unnatural disposition of property by a parent has been
approached elsewhere, indirectly, by permitting support of the children
to be treated as a claim against the decedent's estate,73 but Indiana has
denied this theory74 except in the case of illegitimate children. 75 Even
though it is a criminal offense for a parent not to support his children
during his lifetime,76 still they have no lien or claim against the
parent's estate after he dies. A small measure of correction of this
injustice is accomplished by the Probate Code in permitting the court
to grant a minimum family allowance to the widow and minor children
has issue. N.Y. DECEDENT'S EsTATES LAW § 17; In re Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 366, 107
N.E.2d 492 (1952).
69. See Probate Code §§ 6-301 to 6-308.
70. Legitime refers to that portion of an estate of which a parent cannot dis-
inherit a child without legal cause. See 2 BL. Comm. *491; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND
346.
Protection similar to legitime has been given to spouses in Indiana. The Code of
1852, in blending the law of realty and personalty, ignored the principle of legitime
as had all earlier acts. Curiously enough, however, the amendment of 1853, by pro-
viding that on the death of the wife before the husband her personalty should descend
in the same manner as her realty, in effect made the husband her designated heir as to
one-third of her personalty although there was no similar rule as to the personalty of
the deceased husband. See Ind. Acts 1853, c, 38, § 5. In 1891, however, the statute was
amended to provide that one-third of the personalty of a man dying testate descended
to his wife. Ind. Acts 1891, c. 185, § 1.
71. See Bordwell, supra note 38.
72. Nesbit v. Trimble, 64 Ind. 183 (1878).
73. I) re Straight's Estate, 329 Mich. 319, 45 N.W.2d 300 (1951) ; In re Kozlowski's
Estate, 43 Berks Cty. L.J. (Pa) 17 (1950). See also Elliott v. Elliott, 235 N.C. 153,
69 S.E.2d 224 (1952); Byrne v. Byrne, 112 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
74. Sorin v. Olinger, 12 Ind. 29 (1859).
75. IND ANN. STAT. § 3-629 (Burns Rep . 1946).
76. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1402 et seq. (Burns 1933).
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regardless of any terms in the will but only as long as administration
of the estate is pending. 77 This unfortunate attitude of the probate
law is only slightly corrected by the position taken by the courts in
will contests that an unnatural testamentary disposition may be con-
sidered as a factual element in determining the mental capacity of the
testator. Perhaps the rarity of the occurrence is responsible for the
paucity of the remedy.
III
Presumably, Blackstone's seven canons of descent of realty be-
came the law of Indiana along with the balance of the common law.78
The initial part of the first canon, to the effect that the decedent's
stock of descendants shall take ad infinitum, has always been the Indiana
law both as to realty and personalty. The fourth canon, that taking
should be by representation, was the rule in Indiana until changed by
the Code of 1852,"" which provided that if only grandchildren were
alive, they took per capita; but if there were unequal degrees of kin-
ship, the taking was per stirpes as at common law.8 0 Under the Pro-
bate Code, the issue take per capita if all are of equal degree; otherwise,
the taking is per stirpes.8 ' This taking by representation is not from,
but rather through, the expectant heir. The heir who predeceases his
ancestor has no interest that he can devise nor do his heirs inherit any
of the ancestor's property from him.
The second phase of the first canon, that property never ascended,
whatever may have been the reason therefor,8 2 was initially changed
in Indiana in 1817.83 The extent to which the parents can take has
varied from time to time; but since 1852, the parent or parents have
taken one-fourth of the net estate if the decedent left no issue but
there was a surviving spouse, one-half if there were brothers and
sisters but no issue or spouse, and all if no brothers, sisters, issue, or
77. Probate Code § 6403. However, the family allowance provides only a stop
gap against starvation until the machinery of organized charity commences its move-
ment.
78. The common law prior to James IV was adopted in Indiana by the Act of
July 14, 1795.
79. See Ind. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 28, § 109.
'80. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, § 2; Moran v. Holliday, 39 Ind. App. 201, 77 N.E.
837 (1906) ; Brown v. Taylor, 62 Ind. 295 (1878) ; Cox v. Cox, 44 Ind. 368 (1873).
81. Probate Code § 6-201.
82. See the extended discussion of the origin of this doctrine in 2 PoLLocK &
MAITLAND, HisToRY OF ExGLIsn LAw c. V, § 2.
83. Ind. Acts 1817, c. 21, § 2.
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spouse.8 4 Under the 1852 law, the parents took as joint tenants, whereas
under the Probate Code they take realty as tenants by the entireties.8 5
Neither the second canon, that males shall inherit ahead of females,
nor the third canon, that where there are two or more males of equal
degree the eldest inherits, has been the law of Indiana since it became
a state.
The law has also varied in Indiana from time to time as to whether
Blackstone's fourth canon, that lineal descendants shall take by repre-
sentation, should be extended to collateral heirs. The 1846 Act applied
the doctrine of representation to all collaterals,8 6 and in 1852 the rule
was applied as far as first cousins and their descendants. 87 Under the
Probate Code the taking is per capita if all are of equal degree of
relationship; otherwise it is by representation, and hence per stirpes,
through nephews and nieces.88 But beyond this degree, i.e., that of
uncles and their descendants, the taking is per capita at the nearest
degree of kinship.
The fifth canon, that to inherit one must be of the blood of the
ancestor who was first seized of the property, has survived in a
modified form until the Probate Code. The Code of 1852 followed
the statutes up to that time in providing: "If there be no person
entitled to take the inheritance according to the preceding rules, it
shall descend in the following order:
"First. If the inheritance came to the intestate by gift, devise, or
descent, from the paternal line, it shall go to the paternal grandfather
and grandmother, as joint tenants, and to the survivor of them; if
neither of them be living, it shall go to the uncles and aunts in the
paternal line, and their descendants, if any of them be dead, and if
no such relatives be living, it shall go to the next of kin in equal
degree of consanguinity, among the paternal kindred; and if there be
none of the paternal kindred entitled to take the inheritance as above
prescribed, it shall go to the maternal kindred in the same order.
"Second. If the inheritance came to the intestate by gift, devise,
or descent, from the maternal line, it shall go to the maternal kindred
in the same order; and if there be none of the maternal kindred en-
titled to take the inheritance, it shall go to the paternal kindred in
the same order.
84. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, §§ 3-4, 25; Probate Code § 6-201 (c) (2) (3).
85. Probate Code § 6-201 (c) (7).
86. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 28, § 114.
87. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, §§ 4-5.
88. Probate Code § 6-201 (c) (1).
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"Third. If the estate came to the intestate otherwise than by gift,
devise, or descent, it shall be divided into two equal parts, one of
which shall go to the paternal, and the other to the maternal kindred,
in the order above described; and on the failure of either line, the
other shall take the whole." 89 This legal anachronism which had its
origin in the feudum novzim concept of seisen has been swept away by
the Probate Code.
Both the sixth canon which preferred the whole blood over the
half-blood and the seventh canon which preferred male over female
collaterals have long been abolished in Indiana.90
The scheme of descent to collaterals in Indiana will remain some-
what vague until clarified by judicial decision. All the ancient author-
ities were agreed that personal property went to those persons in the
nearest degree of consanguinity to the deceased. There were, however,
two methods of determining these degrees. The common law counted
up from the deceased to the nearest common ancestor and then down
to the next of kin; the longest of these two counts determined the
degree of consanguinity. The civil law, however, counted up from
the decedent to the nearest common ancestor and then down to the
supposed heir, the degree being the total of the two counts.
The common law canons of descent of real estate, however, fol-
lowed the parental system. That is, one counted up to the first an-
cestor who was seised, and all descendants of such ancestor, however
remote, claimed through him by representation ahead of nearer issue
of a more remote ancestor.
Indiana, since 1817, has followed the civil law rule of descent
except that under the 1852 law brothers and sisters were in class one
as well as parents, thus making uncles and nephews class two. The
Probate Code purports to follow the civil rule except that it interpolates
descendants of brothers and sisters ahead of descendants of grand-
parents or others more remote.
Neither the common law nor the civil law as applied to personalty
in England limited the circle of heirs except by the ancestral property
doctrine.9 This was consonant with the trend of that time that an
89. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 28, § 5; Gray v. Swerer, 37 Ind. App. 384, 94 N.E.
725 (1911). If the form of the property had changed, however, this ancestral doctrine
was lost. Ibid.
90. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 28, § 14; Anderson v. Bell, 140 Ind. 375, 39 N.E. 735
(1894).
91. Although the common law did not place a general limitation on the circle of
heirs requiring that an heir be of a certain degree of consanguinity to the deceased,
restrictions were placed upon the right of particular classes of persons to inherit.
Aliens, felons, usurers, bastards, and, later, Roman Catholics were denied inheritance.
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individual's primary loyalty was to, and dependence was upon, the
family line. It is not surprising that the family responsibility concept
flourished in early America since protection through legal procedure
left something to be desired. Particularly was this true of an agri-
cultural economy such as that of Indiana in the 1850's. But the
average city dweller of today is apt to look upon his cousins, particu-
larly his wife's cousins, merely as those whose visits send him to the
sofa as a sleeping couch. He no longer regards his relatives as the prin-
cipal source of reliance for civil protection and financial aid as did his
great-grandfather. Instead, his ear is now attuned to the state as his
protector and the dispenser of largess in time of need.
The language of Section 201(c)(6) of the Probate Code, as the
Probate Code Commission intended it, is illustrative of the remarkable
change in social thinking that has accompanied the change in economic
society in Indiana since 1852. The fact that the Probate Commission
has attempted to put into legal terms the concept of the state as an
object of an individual's affection, ahead of his family connections, is
revealing evidence of how far society has come to regard the state as
the controlling factor in modem living.
In 1925 an English statute circumscribed the cirle of heirs to
first cousins and their descendants. 92  A similar doctrine was unsuc-
Co. LITr. 8a. (HALE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 251, asserts that in early Wales bastard
children inherited equally with legitimates. Contra, SEamoiM, op. cit. stpra note 5, at
191.) A deflowered virgin was also prohibited from inheriting-presumably because her
value as a marriage partner was destroyed or seriously impaired. Co. Lirr. 32a.
In addition, a wife's breach of marital obligations destroyed her right to dower.
Thus, dower was lost if the wife eloped and abided with an adulterer unless the
husband, without ecclesiastical coercion, be reconciled unto her. The tenant in curtesy
did not, however, lose his right to inherit by adultery nor did the fact that adultery was
mutual save the wife's dower. Co. Liar: 32a. The Probate Code has preserved the
early Indiana concept that prevented one living in adultery at the time of the spouse's
death from sharing in the estate. Probate Code § 6-214. See also Bradley v. Thixton,
117 Ind. 255, 19 N.E. 383 (1888); Wiseman v. Wiseman, 73 Ind. 112 (1880); Shaffer
v. Richardson, 27 Ind. 122 (1876). However, inheritance is not barred by casual acts
of infidelity, Spade v. Hawkins, 60 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E. 1010 (1916); Gaylor v.
McHenry, 15 Ind. 383 (1860). The Probate Code also denies the right of a husband
who has abandoned his wife without justification and with intent to effect a permanent
separation to share in his wife's estate, marking a further shift from the common law
concept of the dominance of the male. Probate Code § 6-125; Morehouse v. Koble, 80
Ind. App. 418, 141 N.E. 254 (1923) ; Hill v. Taylor, 186 Ind. 680, 117 N.E. 930 (1917).
However, the Probate Code takes no notice of the heartless parent who has abandoned
his child before the latter's death. Such parent will inherit equally with the loyal,
devoted spouse. This represents a reluctance of the law to change an ancient concept
to meet contemporary social policy. Since the common law did not permit ascendants
to inherit, there was no reason to punish the parent for neglect. Perhaps, however, the
legal duty of a parent to support a child could be used as an offset against the deserting
parent's claim to share in the child's estate. See Probate Code § 7-1106, providing for
retainer against an heir for debts owing to the deceased.
92. Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 GEo. 5, c. 23, § 46 (v).
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cessfully proposed for the California Code in 193 1.93  But no state
except Maryland has heretofore actually delimited the circle of recog-
nized heirs with the result of making the state a recipient of the de-
ceased's property.94
The theory was adopted by the Model Probate Code and by the
Indiana Probate Code Commission. 5  Whether it was accepted by
the Legislature involves a difficult problem of statutory construction.
"If there is no surviving issue, or parent, or issue of a parent, or
grandparent of the intestate, then to the issue of deceased grand-
parents in the nearest degree of kinship to the intestate per capita
without representation. The degree of kinship shall be computed accord-
ing to the rules of the civil law; that is, by counting upward from the
intestate to the nearest grandparent and then downward to the relative,
the degree of kinship being the sum of these two [2] counts."'9 The
first sentence of this paragraph would indicate that only first cousins
could inherit the property of a deceased intestate lacking nearer kin.97
This presumes that "grandparent" is used in the specific sense of the
father or mother of the parents of the deceased and not in the generic
sense of all ancestors in the ascending line. In earlier laws, however,
the term "grandparents" was used in probate descent sections in the
generic rather than specific sense. The 1817 Statute provided: "The
real and personal estate of persons dying without issue having no
father or mother, brothers or sisters, shall be divided into two equal
parts, one of which shall go to the parental, the other to the maternal
kindred in the following order: first to the grandfather if there be any,
if not, to the grandmother, and if there be neither grandfather nor
grandmother, to uncles and aunts on each side and their descend-
ants. . ... 98g Similar language was 'used in the 1838 Statute: "When
there is no issue of the intestate, nor father or mother, brothers or
93. See Evans, Comments on the California Probate Code, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 602
(1931). The author here suggests the philosophy that the average individual would
rather have the state as the object of his bounty than his remote heirs.
94. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 93, § 146 (1951), limiting descent to the
fifth degree. Perhaps descent under teutonic law ended with six cousins. See 2 POLLOcK
& MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW C. VI, § 2. The ancient Welsh limited descent
to the second cousin level, the escheat being back to the old man of the clan. SEEBOHm,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 194.
95. Probate Code § 6-201 and Commission Comments thereto.
96. Probate Code § 6-201 (c) (6). The Model Probate Code prescribed: "The
degree of kinship shall be computed ... by counting upwards to the nearest common
ancestor." (italics added) SIAIES AND BAYSE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING
A MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22 (1946)- hereafter cited: Model Probate Code.
97. A child of a first cousin is a first cousin, once removed, not a second cousin.
Weaver v. Liberty Trust Co., 170 Md. 212, 183 Atl. 544 (1936).
98. Ind. Acts 1817, c. 21, § 5.
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sisters, nor their descendants, grandfathers or grandmothers, uncles
or aunts in the paternal line or their descendants, great-grandparents
and great-uncles and aunts and their descendants, then that part of the
estate . . . shall escheat. . . ."91 In each instance it was presumed that
"grandparents" was used in the generic sense to include all those
in the ascending line. And the second sentence of 201(c) (6) would
indicate an intention to similarly use the term; otherwise, how could
there be a "nearest" grandparent?
Part II of the Report of the Probate Study Commission, as re-
drafted after the passage of the Code, stated: "Sec. 201 (c) (6) changes
present law by eliminating the possibility of inheritance by persons
/ related to an intestate more remotely than through the intestate's grand-
parent." Unfortunately, this language was not in the report as sub-
mitted to either the 1951 or 1953 Legislature but rather was contained
in a redraft of the Commission's Report after the Probate Code was
passed. The Code provides: "The report of the probate code study
commission made pursuant to the provisions of chapter 302 of the
acts of the 86th Session and chapter 347 of the acts of the 87th Session
of the General Assembly of the state of Indiana may be consulted by
the courts to determine the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of
this act, and may be used as a guide in its construction and applica-
tion." 100 And the Commission as to this Section said: "This is a new
section, the purpose of which is to point out new matter, changes made
b r the new Code, reasons for the change, source of substantive con-
tents, etc. It is intended to be used as a well of information by lawyers
and judges in interpreting the intention and meaning of the different
sections of the Code proper. It is intended by the Commission that it
will have the same standing among lawyers and judges when called
upon to construe a section of the Code as a Legislative Journal. ' 01
But it is a new doctrine of statutory construction if the comments
of the Code Commission, weighty as they may be, can be used as a
guide to a construction of a statute for which the comments were not
available to the Legislature at the time of the adoption of the statute.
Whether the courts will see fit to change the long-established law as to
the body of heirs in the absence of clear evidence of legislative intent
remains to be determined.
Certainly the concept of limiting the body of persons who can
qualify as heirs so as to avoid practical litigation over remote cousins
99. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1838, c. 29, § 6.
100. Probate Code § 6-104.
101. Commission Comments, Ibid.
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is one that is deserving of careful consideration. 10 2 Nor can there be
any doubt as to the power of the sovereign to so limit the number of
heirs. In fact, the whole body of the law of descent as well as of
wills is a result of statutory creation; descent could be altogether
abolished without violating any rights which have constitutional
protection.
As the circle of heirs shrinks, so the importance of escheat expands.
Prior to Quia Emptores, escheat was synonomous with reversion. When
the tenant died without heirs, the property returned to the grantor.
After the statute, however, the land returned to the lord of whom it
was held, not the grantor, because escheat was based upon tenure
whereas a reversion is an estate in land. Escheat arose either propter
delictum tenentis or propter defectum sanguinis.10 3 The first, corrup-
tion of blood for treason or for felonies that were approaching treason,
has disappeared as being an attainder of the blood although, in a similar
vein, statutes are sometimes enacted limiting inheritance to or from
felons. The second type of escheat, that which came into play when
the blood line ran out and one died intestate without lawful heirs, has
remained except that the state is substituted for the lord.
Since 1817, Indiana has provided that the estate of one dying
intestate without lawful heirs should escheat to the state for the benefit
of the common school fund. 04 Such provisions were also contained
in the Code of 1852.105 Later acts provided for the sale of escheated
land,' 1 as well as for the escheat of land acquired by nonresident
aliens,' 0 7  and placed a duty upon the Attorney General to prosecute
the state's claims to escheated property.
102. It should be remembered that the collateral heirs of a deceased heir have no
rights of inheritance through the deceased heir. To inherit through an ancestor by
representation, one must be a lineal heir.
103. Co. LITT. 13b.
104. Ind. Acts 1817, c. 21, § 6.
105. 1 Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 27, § 11; Donaldson v. State ex rel. Honan, 182
Ind. 615, 101 N.E. 485 (1914).
106. Ind. Acts 188.3, c. 77, § 2.
107. Indiana early repudiated the common law rule that aliens could not take
property by inheritance. Co. LIr. 7b. Initially, however, the right to inherit or pass
property by descent was limited to aliens who had taken out their first papers. Ind.
Rev. Stat. 1843, c. 28, §§ 4-12. In 1852, the right of nonresident aliens to hold lands
was limited to the amount of 320 acres. All property in excess of this amount escheats
to the state five years after the time such excess is acquired. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-501
et seq. (Burns Repl. 1951) ; Baldwin v. Witz, 87 Ind. 190 (1882).
Under the Probate Code there are no express provisions permitting an alien to
inherit. Where, however, the United States has a reciprocal treaty concerning inheritance
with another country, such treaty should give aliens who are citizens of that country
the right to inherit in Indiana. Lacking sitch treaties, the common law rule prohibiting
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It seems established that in such escheat cases the state takes as
the ultimate heir of the deceased and not as the holder of an estate in
reversion as did the feoffor of a fee simple before Quia Emptores or
the grant of a fee tail after De Donis. Nor should the principles of
escheat propter delictum tenentis for treason apply where the escheat
has been propter defectum sanquinis. Therefore, the common school
fund should take all the property so escheating as an heir and subject
to all liens and encumbrances thereon, including succession taxes.
Care must be taken to distinguish between instances of escheat
and bona vacantia. In the case of escheat, the state, as noted, takes in
its own right as an heir because there are no other persons who can
legally inherit. However, in event of bona vacantia the state merely
becomes the custodian of the property of missing persons.'08 The
Decedent's Estate Act of 1881 set up a procedure for taking possession
of real estate where on death of the ancestor the heirs did not appear and
for selling it if no heirs had yet appeared at final closing of the estate. 09
The proceeds were paid to the State Treasurer (not to the common
school fund) and held by him until the heirs appeared and claimed
them. This Act of 1881 also contemplated that, if at the time of dis-
tribution no proof of heirship had been made to any portion of the
surplus, within two years after final settlement it should be paid to the
County Treasurer who should transfer it to the State Treasurer to be
entered on the books to the credit of the unknown heirs. Within one
year the court was permitted to give notice to the heirs of the amount
awaiting them, but there was no provision by which title to this money
ever finally vested in the state.
In 1907 an Act provided for the transfer of unclaimed estate
monies from the state treasury to the common school fund and required
the Attorney General to prosecute escheat actions on behalf of the
State of Indiana in the Marion County Superior Court against the
unknown owners of monies in the unclaimed estates' account in the
state treasury which had rested there for five years. The Act further
provided that after five years all future funds which are not claimed
from the State Treasurer should escheat and the rights of the heirs be
barred. A single listing of decedents' names and amounts of un-
inheritance may be revived-particularly as to personalty. Quaere, whether the words
"any person," found in the Probate Code § 6-501, permit an alien to make a will of
property which is not the subject of the exclusions in IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-501
et seq. Dicta in Parent v. Walmsly, 20 Ind. 82 (1862), indicate to the contrary.
108. By statute, in England, escheat is now abolished and all property is treated
as bona vacantia. Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 GEo. 5, c. 23, § 46 (vi).
109. Ind. Acts 1881, c. 45, §§ 185-192.
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claimed monies was required to be posted by the auditor once a year
in an Indianapolis newspaper.110
A 1913 Statute, apparently replacing some provisions of the Act
of 1881, contemplated payment by the administrator to the clerk of
surplus, to which no proof of heirship had been made, on order of
court within thirty days after final settlement. The clerk then paid the
money to the Attorney General who entered the amount on his books
to the credit of the heirs of the decedent and paid it over to the
Treasurer for the benefit of the common school fund. Therefore, these
monies belonging to unknown heirs were actually treated as bona
vacantia, as distinguished from the concept of the state taking property
as an ultimate heir."1
The Probate Code substitutes Sections 6-201 and 7-1112 for the
foregoing provisions except that the Section of the Act of 1907 trans-
ferring all such monies to the common school fund is retained. The
new Statute is not, however, entirely clear. Subsection (a) of 7-1112,
standing alone, could be construed to signify that under Section 6-201
the State still occupies the status of the ultimate heir of the deceased.
Therefore, upon the order of final distribution, the estate of one dying
without heirs would pass immediately and unconditionally to the com-
mon school fund subject to the final order being set aside within one
year for "mistake." 1 2 Section 7-1112 read as a whole would indicate,
however, that despite Section 6-201 (c) (8) the State is not the ulti-
mate heir of the deceased under escheat; but, like the English law, the
entire problem is one of bona vacantia. As a result, the State cannot
acquire title less than seven years after payment is made to the Treas-
urer. Quaere, is this a statute of limitations so that the rights of per-
sons under a disability are not affected by the seven-year limitation, or
is it a nonclaim statute affecting all alike?
While the Probate Code raises many problems relating to the
law of descent, most of those discussed in this article seem capable of
solution without further statutory amendments. The two basic factors
of public policy herein noted that have motivated passage of the Probate
Code will assist the courts in reconciling seeming ambiguities as well
as resolving points of conflict with earlier statutes. Until these matters
are cleared, however, the lot of a title examiner in Indiana will not be
a happy one.
110. Ind. Acts 1907, c. 43. Question may arise as to the sufficiency of the notice.
See In re Estate of Apostolopoulos, 68 Utah 344, 250 Pac. 469 (1926).
111. Ind. Acts 1913, c. 18, § 1.
112. Probate Code § 6-121.
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